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1  Introduction  
“From a practical point of view it is necessary to explicitly consider the fact that most interactions  
between consumers and supermarkets involve multiproduct purchases, incomplete knowledge  
of prices on the consumer's part before visiting a supermarket, and a choice among supermarkets” 
 (RAO AND SYAM, 2001: 62.). 
The German grocery retail sector is characterized by fierce competition for consumers and an 
increase in retail concentration to only a few companies (DOBSON ET AL., 2003; WEISS AND 
WITTKOPP, 2005). It features several formats which differ in the marketing policies such as 
pricing, promotional strategy, service level, variety, focus and convenience (BLATTBERG AND 
NESLIN, 1990). The main formats are discount stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets.  
Much of the existing literature on competition in the grocery retail sector is based on the 
assumption that this competition is restricted to rivalry between stores of the same format 
(intraformat competition) (for an overview see GONZÁLEZ BENITO ET AL., 2005). Taking over 
the consumers’ perspective it becomes evident that the decision to choose a certain store is not 
restricted to stores of only a particular format. In the recent past another stream of research 
emerged  that  considers  and  explores  competition  between  stores  of  different  formats 
(interformat  competition).  The  central  assumption  of  this  stream  is  that  different  formats 
compete for business from most, if not all, consumers or at least the overlapping segments 
(GONZÁLEZ BENITO  ET  AL., 2005; CLEEREN  ET  AL., 2010).  We  adopt this assumption and 
contribute  to  the  existing  research  by  examining  the  performance  of  interformat  price 
competition and by analyzing retail scanner data.
1 We explicitly take into account the multi 
product  character  of  the  grocery  shopping  situation  by  regarding  price  levels  of  typical 
shopping basket instead of single products (LAL  AND MATUTES, 1994; BELL  AND LATTIN, 
1998;  LOY  AND  WEISS, 2009).  According  to  HOSKEN  AND REIFFEN (2004) and RICHARDS 
(2006), we assume that retailers have to consider demand interdependencies when they set or 
change prices within their assortment. As a result, retail competition is conducted by so called 
retailer’s multi product pricing decisions. From the consumers’ perspective the multi product 
character of grocery shopping is based on their preference for time saving one stop shopping 
(e.g. MESSINGER AND NARASIMHAN, 1997; MORSCHETT ET AL., 2006).  
Based on the theory of limited decision making and the three dimensions of retail competition 
(assortment, pricing and transaction costs) we propose a conception of interformat compe 
tition (see MESSINGER AND NARASIMHAN, 1997). Price levels of different formats should only 
be  independent  if  competition  is  restricted  within  formats  (intraformat  competition). 
Analyzing price level information that is based upon individual product price series from 
retail scanner data of 80 German grocery retail stores (2000/2001), we aim to investigate the 
formation of interformat price competition. In contrast to the majority of studies conducted on 
price  competition  we  take  into  account  the  dynamic  character  of  pricing  (see  LOY  AND 
WEAVER, 2006; BAHADIR LUST ET AL., 2007). The dynamic approach gives us insight into the 
relationship of price levels at any point in time and into the intertemporal interactions and 
reactions of stores. For example, when we test for price leadership, we find little evidence for 
the  presumption  that  discount  stores  dictate  prices  in  the  German  grocery  retail  sector. 
Moreover,  we  investigate  the  outcomes  of  interformat  price  competition  and  find  several 
promising positioning strategies of stores and formats that are involved in interformat price 
competition. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Most of the existing research relied on consumer (survey or panel) data (e.g. SOLGAARD AND HANSEN, 2003; 
BHATNAGAR AND RATCHFORD, 2004; GONZÁLEZ BENITO ET AL., 2005; CLEEREN ET AL., 2010). 2 
2  Store choice process and interformat competition 
“Phased” decision strategies have been suggested as characteristic of human decision-making  
in a number of contexts where consumers have to cope with complexity” 
(SHOCKER ET AL., 1991: 185). 
Grocery shopping can be considered to be a domain where the involvement of consumers in 
decision  making  is  rather  low.  Product  prices  and  thus  the  risk  of  decisions  in  grocery 
shopping are comparably low in contrast to other purchases. The same can be expected in the 
case  of  grocery  retail  store  choice.  In  our  work  we  apply  the  theory  of  limited  decision 
making  to  the  problem  of  store  choice  (KROEBER RIEL  AND  WEINBERG,  2003).    Limited 
decision  making  is  proposed  by  consumer  behavior  theory  to  model  low  involvement 
decisions and can be characterized as a hierarchical process: First, consumers consider only a 
subset (evoked set or choice set) from the total number of alternatives (universal set) that 
satisfies  certain  needs  on  the  basis  of  internal  information,  like  experiences,  images  or 
predisposition (see HOWARD, 1969; SHOCKER ET AL., 1991). In the second step, consumers 
choose  among  the  elements  of  the  evoked  set,  using  external  information,  too.  From  the 
marketing perspective, being in the evoked set of many consumers is essential to succeed in 
the competition.  
Consumer behavior theory assumes that specific key attributes guide the decisions in any of 
the  steps  of  limited  decision  making.  This  view  is  adopted  by  several  authors  who 
investigated in consumer (store) choice (e.g. SHOCKER ET AL., 1991; REUTTERER AND TELLER, 
2009). We now discuss the main attributes for store choice in the retail sector (see MESSINGER 
AND NARASIMHAN, 1997). 
Assuming consumers to have a preference for one stop shopping, a wide (and possibly deep) 
assortment  appears  to  be  an  important  criterion.  Investigations  on  the  basis  of  consumer 
surveys  found  that  the  breadth  and  depth  of  a  store’s  assortment  is  the  criterion  for 
constitution of the evoked set (first step decision) (BELL AND LATTIN, 1998; SOLGAARD AND 
HANSEN, 2003). However, we can also image that consumers only need a few (basic) products 
to satisfy their weekly needs. For this segment of consumers this “would indicate that there 
are other factors in addition to the absence or presence of product categories that determine 
[store choice]” (BHATNAGAR AND RATCHFORD, 2004: 39).  
As German consumers are supposed to be extraordinarily price sensitive one might expect 
that price levels are an important attribute (decision criterion) in the grocery retailing sector 
(SOLGAARD  AND HANSEN, 2003; MORSCHETT  ET  AL., 2006). Even if consumers may have 
relatively poor knowledge of individual product prices, they are supposed to make accurate 
distinctions about price levels in different stores or formats (DICKSON AND SAWYER, 1990; 
BELL AND LATTIN, 1998).  Consequently, grocery price advertising and expectations of the 
non advertised products are assumed to jointly determine the store choice (RAO AND SYAM, 
2001). There is also reason to believe that German retailers themselves regard the price image 
as the key criterion for consumers’ store choice. Most, if not all, formats provide a ‘discount 
price range’ and some explicitly communicate this (SCHMEDES, 2005).
2 
The category transaction costs comprises different efforts that have to be made by consumers 
in the context of grocery shopping like, i.e., searching for the best offer, traveling to the store 
and transportation of the goods (SLADE, 1999; CARLTON AND PERLOFF, 2000; GIJSBRECHTS ET 
AL., 2008). These efforts are calculated as costs by the amount and value of time they take. 
                                                 
 
2 One remarkable example is the claim of one convenience store: “Did you know that there is a discounter inside 
every famila store?” 3 
Consumers are assumed to rationally try to minimize the transaction costs of shopping, i.e., by 
visiting  a  shop  close  to  their  housing  area  and/or  complete  shopping  trips  by  one stop 
shopping (MESSINGER AND NARASIMHAN, 1997). 
The conception of interformat competition 
From the perspective of demand, store formats might be defined as broad competing  
categories that provide benefits to match the needs of different types of consumers” 
(GONZÁLEZ-BENITO ET AL., 2005: 59).  
In  the  following,  we  take  the  retailers’  perspective  and  try  to  explain  the  formation  of 
interformat  competition.  The  first  central  assumption  is  that  (only)  the  above  mentioned 
Before we introduce our conception of intra  and interformat competition we characterize the 
three  criterions  are  meaningful  for  consumers’  store  choice  when  they  plan  their  (next) 
shopping trip and thus for competition between stores (MESSINGER AND NARASIMHAN, 1997; 
HOSKEN AND REIFFEN, 2007). The second assumption is that consumers prefer to visit only 
one store per period (week) buying a regular shopping basket.
3  
Figure 1 illustrates our idea of interformat competition. The three circles represent the three 
major decision criterions: assortment, expected price level (price image) and transaction costs.  
The  following  typical  characteristics  of  the  major  German  retail  formats  show  that  the 
decision criterions of consumers can also be interpreted as the  main dimensions of retail 
competition.  
German supermarkets (SM) provide wide but flat assortments at low transaction (travel) costs. 
They have a high degree of spatial coverage and are often placed near housing areas. Low 
prices are originally not part of their marketing strategy, but many supermarkets do provide a 
narrow, typically private labeled, low priced product range (SCHMEDES, 2005). In contrast, the 
main characteristic of discount stores (DS) is a reliably low product price level as they grant 
EDLP (Every day low Price) (LEVY ET AL., 1998). By placing their stores near homesteads 
they also offer low transaction costs (search costs and travel costs). The assortment of genuine 
discount stores (so called hard discount stores) is typically narrow and flat, so that they do not 
compete in this dimension. But the so called soft discount stores provide national brands, too. 
This strategy of deepening their assortment can strengthen their competitive position relative 
to  conventional  formats  (super   and  hypermarkets)  (DELEERSNYDER  ET  AL.,  2007).  So, 
hypermarkets (HM) provide deep and wide assortments at price levels somewhat between 
supermarkets and discount stores (SCHMEDES, 2005). Transaction costs, especially travel costs 
are generally rather high as hypermarkets are situated by Greenfield strategy, i.e. in trading 
estates. Thus, consumers have to bridge wide distances and hypermarkets originally do not 
compete with other formats in the dimension of transaction costs. However, a good transport 
connection and convenience leadership (one stop shopping or fast and efficient transactions) 
can lower transaction costs, too (MORSCHETT ET AL., 2006).  
On the whole, each format (discount stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets) is supposed to 
compete  mainly  in  two  dimensions  illustrated  by  the  position  of  the  formats  in  the 
overlapping segment of two dimensions (darker grey). The area in the centre of the graphic 
represents the overlapping consumer segment for that all three formats potentially compete 
(dark grey). As can be seen from the graphical representation, each format involves in this 
center of interformat competition by meeting the third dimension that was originally not their 
core competence. 
                                                 
 
3 In fact, not every shopping trip is a regular shopping trip (KAHN AND SCHMITTLEIN, 1989; REUTTERER AND 
TELLER, 2009). We will come to this point later, defining the shopping basket and price levels for our empirical 
analysis. 4 











Recalling the supposed two step process of store choice, interformat competition means that 
retail stores get into the evoked set of consumers who consider first the dimension that is 
originally  not  characteristic  for  their  format.  According  to  the  literature,  we  assume  the 
assortment to be an important or even the most important criterion for the first step decision 
for many consumers. Thus, super  and hypermarkets will be in their evoked set while (hard) 
discount  stores  will  be  excluded.  Discount  stores  would  have  to  widen  and  deepen  their 
assortment if they attempt to involve in interformat competition and if assortment is the most 
meaningful decision criterion. If the price level is the second step criterion, we would observe 
fierce interformat price competition. Taking into account the high price sensitivity of German 
consumers and the high impact and fast growth of discount stores we could alternatively 
imagine a decision making progress that starts even with the attribute ‘price level’, followed 
by a trade off of assortment against transaction costs in the second step. This trade off leads 
to the choice of hypermarkets or discount stores, while supermarkets with a high price image 
would already be excluded in the first step. Supermarkets with a low price image would stay 
in the evoked set and can involve in interformat price competition for consumers regular 
shopping trips. 
As worked out in the formats description above, supermarkets and discount stores really try to 
involve in the third dimension, too. One may doubt that this is a reasonable strategy for all 
formats and stores. Especially the wide and deep assortment of hypermarkets seems to be a 
promisingly successful strategy to differentiate from other formats as there exists a market 
basket size threshold beyond which consumers self select hypermarkets (BHATNAGAR  AND 
RATCHFORD, 2004).
4 Accordingly, interformat price competition should be relevant in product 
categories  that  are  available  in  all  store  formats.  Our  empirical  analysis  includes  an 
introducing part that describes the assortment and pricing strategies of formats and stores. The 
main part focuses on the price competition (relationship and reactions of price levels) and the 
last part points to the outcomes of interformat price competition. Thereby we try not only to 
test for the existence of interformat price competition but also to investigate its performance 
and to detect its potential profiteers. 
 
 
                                                 
 
4 The authors measure market basket size by how many different product categories are included and refer to 
supermarkets  instead  of  hypermarkets,  actually  but  from  the  context  it  can  be  seen  that  it  also  holds  for 
hypermarkets (BHATNAGAR AND RATCHFORD, 2004). 5 
3  Data and methodology 
“we do find evidence to support a particular form of  strategic pricing, namely intertemporal pricing” 
(LOY AND WEAVER, 2006: 2). 
The data under study are provided by Markt Daten Kommunikation GmbH, Köln, Germany 
(MADAKOM, 2002). They comprise retail scanner data from German grocery stores for 104 
weeks from the first week in 2000 to the last week in 2001. To identify the product categories 
relevant for competition, we choose those categories that are sold in most, if not all, stores 
over the entire period. We assume that prices of frequently purchased products are more 
important for the store’s price image and should, therefore, better reflect the expected price 
level of consumers that we focus. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the most meaningful brand 
(having the highest sales quantity) in each product category in each store being sold steadily 
over the whole period (at least in 90 out of the 104 weeks).Thereby, we attempt to capture the 
realized price level of each store that can be supposed to reflect their price image. Thus, we 
generate shop specific product baskets consisting of one brand per product category in each 
store. Note that the store baskets are equal with respect to the product categories included but 
may differ in the brands as the most meaningful brands can be different in each store (but 
consistent over time). We present three samples of stores: The first sample covers 14 stores 
where 60 food products and beverages are steadily bought by consumers (stores with a wide 
assortment)  (see  appendix  1).  The  second  sample  includes  22  stores  where  46  product 
categories are steadily sold (stores with a medium sized assortment) and a third sample that 
incorporates 80 stores from all store formats where the relatively smallest assortment of 24 
product categories are continuously sold. These 24 product categories (basic assortment) are 
frequently purchased by consumers and many of them are signpost items (i.e. butter, coffee).
5 
They can also be described as the intersection of the formats’ assortments or ‘overlapping 
offerings’ (CLEEREN ET AL., 2010). Before we concentrate on this so called basic assortment, 
let us give a brief description of all three samples.  
The stores under study belong to different retail companies and can be classified into three 
groups,  which  represent  the  store  formats  (discount  stores,  supermarkets,  hypermarkets) 
(MADAKOM, 2002). Basically this classification rests upon the store size, but it is also strongly 
related to the above mentioned strategic dimensions of the formats (see tab.1). The sample of 
stores  selling  60  product  categories  is  composed  of  only  hypermarkets,  confirming  the 
assumption that there can exist a market basket size threshold beyond which consumers self 
select hypermarkets (BHATNAGAR AND RATCHFORD, 2004). In contrast, discount stores occur 
only in the third sample, as no more than the basic 24 product categories are bought here 
steadily. 
By analyzing the weighted price levels of the so called basic assortment of top selling brands 
we confirm the formats’ price level ranking by SCHMEDES (2005):
6  The weighted price levels 
are lowest in discount stores and highest in supermarkets (see tab. 1). But, as mentioned 
above,  there  is reason  to believe that  not  the  top selling brands  compete in prices  as  we 
                                                 
 
5 Research suggests that consumers use the prices of signpost items (loss leaders, key value items) to form an 
overall impression of a store's prices. That impression then guides their purchase of other items for which they 
have less price knowledge (ANDERSON AND SIMESTER, 2003). 
6 The weighted price levels are given by   ,  = ∑      , 
 ,  
    ∑      , 
 ,  
     where n = 1,…,N (N is the number of 
product categories under study in the subsamples), for each store i = 1,…80 and each time t = 1,…,104. We 
weighted the individual prices of the top selling (lowest priced) brand by their overall proportion of sales on the 
total sales in the assortment of the subsample to consider directly their purchase frequency. The weights are 
constant over time and identical for all stores (see appendix 1). Alternative weights were applied verifying the 
robustness of the results presented here. 6 
potentially compare private brands with national brands. For that reason, we will have a closer 
look at the low price level range (discount range) by choosing the brands with the lowest 
average price over the whole period in each of the 24 product categories constituting the basic 
assortment. As expected, the average weighted price level of the discount range is lower than 
the  prices  of  the  top selling  brands  in  each  of  the  store  formats.  In  fact,  we  found  that 
hypermarkets offer an even less expensive discount range than discount stores, but the value 
of the variation coefficient of hypermarkets is more than twice as large as the one of discount 
stores.  The great price level dispersion of hypermarkets indicates that some hypermarkets try 
to get into the price competition with discount stores while the remaining hypermarkets do 
not. At this point of the analysis, we cannot reject the hypothesis that some supermarkets try 
to get into the choice set of low price shoppers, either. Indeed, the average price level is 
highest but the large variation can be a sign for price competing supermarkets, too. 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics on the three samples 
Store format  Discount stores  Supermarkets  Hypermarkets  Total 
1
st sample: wide assortment: 60 product categories continuously sold 
Number of stores (retail companies)  0  0  14 (4)  14 (4) 
Average price level (and variation [%]) 
of top selling brands  n.a.





nd sample: middle sized assortment: 46 product categories continuously sold 
Number of stores (retail companies)  0  2 (2)  19 (4)  21 (5) 
Average price level (and variation [%]) 







rd sample: smallest assortment (basic shopping basket): 24 product categories continuously sold 
Number of stores (retail companies)  19 (2)  25 (5)  36 (4)  80 (5) 
Average price level (and variation [%]) 









Average price level (and variation [%]) 










a not available 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
The average price levels of the wider assortments approve that supermarkets price higher than 
hypermarkets, and the ranks of the stores’ average price levels mainly persist over time (see 
tab.  1  and  fig.  2).
7  Some  hypermarkets  change  their position  with  a  growing  assortment. 
Whereas they are rather expensive in the basic assortment, they sell the almost cheapest wide 
assortment. This could be a cue for their location beyond the overlapping segment as well as 
for  the  important  role  of  the  price  image  as  the  final  selection  criteria  for  large  basket 
shoppers, too. 
For the analysis of interformat competition we concentrate on the price levels of the basic 
assortment and will have a closer look at the relationship of price levels in the third sample. 
This data set comprises 19 discount stores, 25 supermarkets, and 36 hypermarkets being under 
the management of five different companies (named A, B, C, D and E here). The number of 
stores within each company ranges from 9 (company D) to 24 (company A). Table 2 shows 
that company A is the only one that includes stores from all formats. 
 
                                                 
 
7 LOY AND WEAVER (2006) also came to that result.   7 
Tabe 2  Descriptive statistics on the companies and formats (chains) in the third sample 
Chain
a  DS A  DS E  SM A  SM B
  SM C  SM D  SM E  HM A  HM B  HM C  HM D 
No. of stores  4  15  8  3  6  5  3  12  8  12  4 
Market share [%]
b  8.1  20.7  11.0  3.4  6.6  4.9  3.0  19.1  8.0  12.9  2.3 
Share of discount 
range’s sales [%]
c  65.6  72.4  43.4  52.5  48.7  52.9  67.9  38.6  41.5  44.3  46.8 
Legend: 
a stores of company format combination (so called chains) SM B, SM E and HM B are not characterized by a 
common strategy within the same company and therefore shaded in grey (see also section 4) 
 
b market shares are measured as the proportion of chain’s average sales per m² on total sales per m²  
c the share of discount range’s sales is related to the volume sales of the top selling brands
 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
The more related price levels are across stores or the closer price levels’ co movements, the 
closer should be their rivalry. First, the averaged gap between the price levels MD
ij of each 
two stores (i and j) should reflect their similarity in costs and/or demand. Moreover, grocery 
retailing firms monitor their competitors’ prices and tend to respond to (close) competitors’ 
price  changes  either  simultaneously  or  deferred.  Thus,  we  choose  an  error  correction 
specification of the following form, where the change in one price level ∆p ,  is related to the 
change in another price level ∆p ,  as well as the past equilibrium errors ect    =  p ,    −
α  − α p ,     and the past price level movements:
8  
∆  ,  =    +      ,    −    −     ,     +   ∆  ,  + 
  Γ 
 
   
    ∆  ,    +   Γ 
 
   
    ∆  ,    +    
,   with   ~  0,  
  .                            (1) 
Thereby,  we  conduct  two  additional  indicators  of  the  price  competition  (dynamic  price 
relationship) of each two stores. Parameter β2 reflects the contemporary adjustment or the 
degree of synchronization of both price levels as positive, and higher values of β2 point to 
higher synchronization. Parameter β1 reflects the speed of adjustment or how fast the two 
price levels return to their long run equilibrium if and only if such a long run equilibrium 
exists. Therefore, we start by testing for stationarity based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
test and SCHMIDT AND PHILLIPS (1992). We identify the optimal lag order of the price levels 
by means of different information criteria (AKAIKE, 1974; SCHWARZ, 1978).
9 Then we test for 
the cointegration rank choosing an appropriate trend specification and select the preferable 
Granger causality direction (HAMILTON, 1994; JOHANSEN, 1988; LÜTKEPOHL, 2005).  
We do not restrict our analysis to the cointegrated price level series, as our aim is to reveal 
differences in the relationships of stores both from the same format (intraformat relationships) 
and from different formats (interformat relationships). Thus, the first outcome could be that 
price levels of intraformat competitors are cointegrated, while price levels of different store 
formats are not related. In fact, it is not that easy. The price levels neither of the top selling 
brands nor of the discount range are cointegrated within formats and move independently 
across  different  formats  over  time.  Therefore,  we  investigate  which  stores  (formats  and 
companies)  aspire  to  compete  in  the  interformat  competition.  First,  we  define  the  three 
proposed indicators of rivalry (the gap between both price levels MD
ij, the contemporary 
adjustment term β 
   and the estimated speed of adjustment β 
  ) as endogenous variables. Then, 
                                                 
 
8 where ∆   ≡    −      and i and j refer to one out of the 80 stores in the third sample (i = 1,…,80, j = 1,…,80, 
i ≠ j). The past price level movements are illustrated by the sum of lagged price level changes ∑ Γ  
        ∆     
where k is the lag order (k = 1,…,K) (see also footnote 14). 
9 The optimal maximum lag order is k
*= 3 for low price levels k
*= 5 for top selling brands. Accordingly, we 
specify K = 5 in the model for top selling brands (main price level) and K = 3 for the low price levels.  8 
we try to ascribe them to company and format effects controlling for regional and location 
characteristics using the following specification:
10 
    =    + ∑         
   + ∑        
   +        
   +        
   +         
   +    .  , with    ~  0,  
  .             (2) 
4  Research results 
“Whatever choice the retailer makes is important since it determines retailer's success in achieving  
its objectives in terms of […], enhancing the store's image, and creating a price image“ 
(LEVY ET AL., 1998: 116). 
Based on the previous sections of the paper, our first objective is to find out whether the 
empirical data set confirms any interformat price competition. We cannot reject the hypo 
thesis of entirely unrelated price level series across different formats (interformat price com 
petition). As can be seen in table 3, low level price levels are more frequently cointegrated 
between stores of different formats than price levels of the top selling brands. This could 
indicate that interformat price competition is conducted by the discount range. Our second 
aim is to understand the formation of interformat price competition. We find that discounters 
are not the (only) price leaders in interformat price competition. On the one hand, price levels 
of discount stores are cointegrated to a lesser extent with stores of other formats than vice 
versa. If we cannot reject the hypothesis of cointegration, discounters’ price levels are more 
often followed by their competitors than vice versa. Thus, the proportion of Granger causality 
is highest for discounters and price levels of top selling brands (66.30 percent). On the other 
hand, the remaining third of discount stores seems to react on price levels of supermarkets or 
hypermarkets. Surprisingly, for the low price range, the empirical data makes us conclude that 
the proportion of discounters that affect other formats’ price levels is smaller than for top 
selling brands. 
Table 3  The positioning of formats in interformat competition   
  Discount  stores  Supermarkets  Hypermarkets  Total 
Number of observations  1159  1375  1584  2059 
Price level of top selling brands (basic assortment) 
Proportion of Cointegration [%]  56.82  60.95  61.83  60.42 
Proportion of Granger causality [%]  66.30  47.73  40.88    
Price level of low price range (basic assortment) 
Proportion of Cointegration [%]  51.82  67.71  62.63  61.63 
Proportion of Granger causality [%]  59.84  40.82  49.90    
Legend: Totally, we get 3160 equations where one price level is explained by another price level and 2059 equations include 
stores from different formats. From the 1159 equations which include one discount store, 56.82 percent are significantly 
cointegrated and in 66.30 percent of these 658 equations, the price levels of the discount store seems to cause the price levels 
of the other store format. 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
Altogether, these results confirm that all three formats are partly engaged in interformat price 
competition.  For  that  reason,  the  stores’  format  tends  to  not  be  the  only  fundamental 
determinant of the engagement in interformat price competition. In order to identify the other 
important determinants and to examine the performance of interformat competition, we have a 
closer look at the estimation results of the dummy regression in table 4.
 As small gaps (mean 
absolute  differences  MD
ij)  between  the  price  levels  are  supposed  to  point  to  closer 





     1
  ]. Further explanations of abbreviations and variables are given in appendix 2. 
 9 
competition, price levels between stores from the same borough are significantly smaller. The 
smaller constant in the case of low level prices than of the most relevant price levels and the 
significantly negative parameters of the cointegration dummy are in line with our assumption. 
The estimation results signify interformat price competition and low level price levels tend to 
be more closely related than top selling brands’ price levels are. 
Table 4  Dummy regression’s results
a 
  Mean absolute gap  
between price levels 
Contemporary  
adjustment 
Speed of  
adjustment 
Price level  Main  Low  Main  Low  Main  Low 
Constant  17.31***  15.50***  0.116***  0.0814***   0.235***   0.137*** 
  (0.341)
b  (0.317)  (0.0110)  (0.00928)  (0.00471)  (0.00413) 
Discount stores   3.021*   8.921***  0.0404   0.00819  0.0760***  0.0589*** 
(1.629)  (1.290)  (0.0558)  (0.0434)  (0.0240)  (0.0193) 
Supermarkets  1.611*  0.713  0.166***  0.0520*   0.0152   0.0529*** 
(0.846)  (0.670)  (0.0317)  (0.0293)  (0.0136)  (0.0130) 
Hypermarkets  3.369***   2.751***   0.0526**  0.0371*   0.0205*   0.0327*** 
(0.639)  (0.505)  (0.0244)  (0.0201)  (0.0105)  (0.00894) 
DS A   0.720   0.709  0.0172  0.336**  0.0304   0.0506 
  (5.323)  (4.208)  (0.216)  (0.153)  (0.0927)  (0.0682) 
DS E  2.596  1.019  0.367***  0.239***   0.00629   0.0267 
  (2.013)  (1.591)  (0.0660)  (0.0526)  (0.0284)  (0.0234) 
SM A   6.135**   1.693   0.229***  0.180**  0.0198   0.0131 
  (2.484)  (1.963)  (0.0796)  (0.0863)  (0.0342)  (0.0384) 
SM B   13.39*   13.68**  n.c.
c  n.c.  n.c.  n.c. 
  (7.224)  (5.712)         
SM C   9.707***   9.277***  0.217  0.339***  0.0560   0.0821* 
  (3.310)  (2.616)  (0.173)  (0.0973)  (0.0744)  (0.0433) 
SM D   13.44***   3.333  0.185  0.402***   0.0740  0.0159 
  (4.014)  (3.173)  (0.124)  (0.135)  (0.0534)  (0.0600) 
SM E   9.840  3.937  n.c.  0.469***  n.c.  0.0796 
  (7.223)  (5.712)    (0.172)    (0.0767) 
HM A   9.709***   3.182**  0.0886   0.00163  0.0431*   0.00224 
  (1.640)  (1.297)  (0.0575)  (0.0481)  (0.0247)  (0.0214) 
HM B  9.169***  11.29***  0.218*  0.191**  0.00650  0.0220 
  (2.420)  (1.913)  (0.114)  (0.0836)  (0.0492)  (0.0372) 
HM C   9.282***   6.767***  0.666***  0.0681   0.115   0.0661*** 
  (1.644)  (1.294)  (0.210)  (0.0530)  (0.0902)  (0.0236) 
HM D   3.767   5.233  0.290*   0.113  0.0720  0.0384 
  (5.108)  (4.041)  (0.149)  (0.295)  (0.0641)  (0.131) 
Same location  0.904   0.225   0.0140  0.0275   0.0134   0.000749 
  (0.635)  (0.502)  (0.0231)  (0.0199)  (0.00996)  (0.00887) 
Same borough   2.931**   1.797*  0.0233  0.0660*  0.00216   0.0101 
  (1.244)  (0.983)  (0.0484)  (0.0395)  (0.0208)  (0.0176) 
Coint. dummy   1.170**   3.375***         
  (0.458)  (0.363)         
No. of obs.  3,160  3,160  1,254  1,779  1,254  1,779 
F statistics  8.20***  21.24***  12.42***  7.44***  3.31***  5.27*** 
Adj. R² [%]  3.73  9.82  11.31  5.15  2.52  3.48 
Legend: 
a variables’ abbreviations and explanations are in appendix 2
 
b standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
c no significant cointegration between price series within this group 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
The estimation results show some facts about the role of formats and companies and their 
interactive influence on the rivalry of stores (tab. 4). First and foremost, discount stores have 
significantly smaller price level gaps than the reference group (consisting of stores of different 
formats and companies). Supermarkets and hypermarkets, however, tend to have relatively 
large price level gaps between their basic assortments of top selling brands but relatively 
small  gaps  between  their  low  level  price  ranges.  Company  factors  tend  to  exhibit  very 10 
individual effects on price level gaps. Whereas company factors have no significant effect on 
the resulting price gap in the discount segment (DS A, DS E), supermarkets of company C 
(SM C), as well as hypermarkets of company A and C (HM A, HM C) show relatively small 
price gaps. The analysis of the dynamic relationship of price levels reconfirm the relevance of 
company factors and the exceptional position of company C, whose super  and hypermarkets 
have significantly stronger related price levels (higher synchronized, returning faster to their 
long rum  equilibrium).
11  The  estimated  parameters  denote  that  company  C  is  likely  to 
compete more strongly with discount stores than other companies do. DC E synchronizes 
price level changes above average. In contrast, SM B and SM E show independent price level 
movements and will be excluded from the next steps of the analysis. 
We  now  compare  intuitively  the  average  price  levels  of  company  formats  combinations 
(chains) and consequently rely on the assumption, that a common strategy of stores of the 
same  chain  is  evident.  Therefore,  we  also  exclude  HM  B  because  its  price  level  gap  is 
significantly  higher  than  those  of  all  others.  To  show  the  retailer’s  efforts  in  interformat 
competition, figure 2 gives an insight into the chains’ pricing behavior. 











SM D  HM D
b 
Legend: 
a stores of chain SM B, SM E and HM B are not characterized by a common strategy and therefore not presented 
 
b the maximum value of the vertical price level axis is 1.75 DM instead of 1.50 DM 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
Figure 2 illustrates the price level movements both of the top selling and the discount range 
brands as well as the mean proportion of price promotions over time. All three items of 
information could be crucial for the targeting consumer segment since they are part of the 
(pricing) strategy of each chain. Weighted price levels of the basic assortment seem to be 
hardly affected by any significant cost shock over the two years period, although inflation in 
the food sector reached up to 4.5 percent and single product prices, i.e. of milk products rose 
significantly from 2000 to 2001 in the data set (STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, 2011). In all 
chains,  top selling  brands  are  priced  significantly  higher  and  affected  more  by  price 
promotions than the low price brands. Consumers buy significantly fewer price promoted 
brands in discounters (especially in DS E) than in other formats. In company C, the proportion 
                                                 
 
11 The results of the dynamic analysis seem fairly confusing when we focus on the formats’ behavior because 
the parameters’ directions mainly oppose our expectation. Additionally, the price levels of the top selling brands 
are partly higher synchronized and return faster to their long run equilibrium than price levels of the low price 
range do. We will try to explain this contradiction later concentrating on the company factors now. 11 
of price promotions and their influence on the price level of the top selling brands is highest. 
Moreover, company C sells the cheapest shopping baskets, no matter if we examine the top 
selling brands or the low price range. Overall, chains we do not exclude according to our 
previous analysis show very close main and lowest price levels, indicating a fierce interformat 
price competition. Certainly, instead of a conspicuous price leader, we observe sophisticated 
interformat  (low)  price  level  competitors.  Are  the  EDLP  strategists  the  profiteers  of 
interformat competition or do other chains win the interformat consumer segment?  
To assess the performance of each chain we have a look at their market share of sales and the 
impact of their discount ranges on their sales (tab. 2). Comparing stores of different size and 
formats, we have to consider the size of the store and the width and depth of the assortment 
when we evaluate their success in interformat competition. For that reason, we weight the 
stores’ sales volume of the basic assortment with the store size and relate it to the total sales 
per square meter over all stores. The impact of the discount range is measured by the sales 
volume of the low price range divided by the sales volume of the top selling brands in each 
store.  
The highest market shares of the overlapping consumer segment are gained by discount stores 
and hypermarkets (tab. 2). This might confirm the assumption that (low) price levels are the 
most  important  (first  step)  criterion  for  consumers  who  plan  to  buy  their  regular  basic 
shopping basket. Correspondingly, only those supermarkets that we presume to be engaged in 
intraformat price competition reach appreciable market shares in the basic assortment. On the 
contrary, discount stores seem to realize higher market shares if they widen their assortment. 
For example, DS E is characterized through sizable gaps between the main and the low price 
levels  because  consumers  tend  to  prefer  manufacturer  brands  instead  of  private  brands. 
Furthermore, we have to consider that the market shares of hypermarkets can be biased as 
they  may  include  the  outcomes  of  intraformat  competition.  For  example,  we  assign  a 
remarkable market share to HM B, although it seems to be hardly engaged in interformat 
price  competition.  In  any  case,  those  hypermarkets  appearing  to  be  interformat  price 
competitors seem to be well positioned in the whole retail market. Their pricing strategies 
succeed in both, interformat and intraformat competition.  
The impact of the low price range (discount range) can be evidence of the idea of interformat 
competition presented above. Discount stores reach EDLP shoppers to a higher extent than 
super  and hypermarkets although consumers could realize an even lower price level if they 
visit stores of company C. Following our conception, supermarkets seem to be excluded from 
the evoked set of (only) price sensitive consumers in the first step if they do not involve in 
interformat  competition  and  concentrate  on  their  core  competence.  SM  C  can  join  the 
interformat competition as an appreciable number of price sensitive consumers buy there. But, 
unlike (hard) discounters, SM C sells low priced shopping baskets whose price levels are 
notably influenced by price promotion and reaches consumers who are equally interested in 
low price levels and a wide assortment (i.e., brand loyal consumers). From this perspective, 
discounters  selling  solely  EDLP  products  would  restrict  their  business  to  intraformat 
competition, but the success of DS E proves that discounters benefit from a widening of their 
assortment, too.  
5  Conclusion 
If rivalry in German grocery retailing sector was restricted to intraformat price competition 
one would expect significantly different price levels to be realized by discount stores (low), 
hypermarkets  (medium)  and  supermarkets  (high).  The  greatest  similarities  in  price  levels 
would be within the store formats. Assuming a two step store choice process, we present a 
conception  of  intra   and  interformat  competition  that  combines  the  three  meaningful 12 
dimensions of retail competition (assortment, pricing and transaction costs). Based on this 
idea, we investigate the interformat price competition. 
Given the multi product character of retailers and assuming that consumers make their store 
choice on the basis of price images instead of searching for item by item price information, 
we analyze weighted price level series from up to 80 stores (5 companies) from retail scanner 
data from the German grocery retail sector (2000/2001). The empirical investigation can give 
us insights into the interformat price competition and the importance of the pricing dimension 
in retail competition that we sum up as follows.    
Our results strongly confirm that all three formats are partly engaged in interformat compe 
tition  and  do  not  approve  the  exclusive  price  leadership  of  discount  stores.  Super   and 
hypermarkets generally are not following the pricing of discount stores; neither in the main 
assortment  (top selling  brands)  nor  in  the  low price  range,  although  the  low price  levels 
appear  to  be  very  similar  in  all  formats.  The  last  fact  confirms  that  German  retailers 
themselves regard their (low) price image to be essential for succeeding in competition. Our 
empirical investigation shows that this hypothesis holds only for supermarkets. We figure out 
an alternative understanding of the formation of interformat price competition. Contrary to the 
common belief that discounters are the price leaders and that the format itself does determine 
the  success  in  interformat  price  competition,  we  identify  the  profiteers  of  interformat 
competition  by  their  active  efforts  in  the  dimension  being  originally  not  part  of  their 
marketing  strategy.  Thus,  those  discount  stores  succeed  that  enlarge  their  assortment  by 
manufacturer brands and offer price promotions; and so do supermarkets that have a low price 
image. Thereby HILO strategy (frequent price promotions) can be as effective as EDLP to 
communicate  the  ‘right’  price  image  –  the  price  image  that  attracts  consumers  of  the 
interformat competition segment. In contrast, stores that maintain their core competence and 
remain beyond interformat competition do not only fail in interformat competition but in 
intraformat competition as well. In particular, some supermarkets seem to fail in the whole 
market because they do not actively revise their strategy and their image. Again, we mention 
the image as it can be a link between a common (price) strategy and the chain’s achievement 
in interformat price competition. It seems to be more likely to be in the consumers’ evoked set 
of store choice when pricing strategies are consistent within the same chain. Also, most price 
levels seem to be relatively consistent over time. So price level information from the past last 
very long and consumers decide ‘right’ if they use internal price information (experience) 
planning the next shopping trip. Nevertheless, what happens if consumers notice a price rise 
in their chosen (favorite) store? By what means can they make a quick and check whether 
price levels in other stores have also risen? Frequently advertised product prices (i.e. like 
butter and coffee prices) are supposed to signal the overall price level of the store. Future 
research should investigate the existence and the attributes of signpost items. 
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Appendix 1  Product categories under study and their weights 
 
Product category  Weights  Product category  Weights 




Butter  0.0467 
Cheese  0.0318  Asparagus (tinned)  0.0018 
Coffee  0.0387  Cake (fresh)  0.0047 
Condensed milk  0.0371  Convenience foods (meat)  0.0025 
Desserts  0.0127  Eggs  0.0198 
Edible oil  0.0124  Frensh fries (deep frozen)  0.0066 
Fresh milk  0.0498  Green beans (tinned)  0.0032 
Instant cacaos  0.0038  Mushrooms (tinned)  0.0085 
Pizzas and quiches (deep frozen)  0.0203  Rice  0.0028 
Sauerkraut  0.0072  Sweets  0.0023 
Vegetables (deep frozen)  0.0062  Ananas (tinned)  0.0030 
Yogurt  0.1591  Fish (tinned)  0.0095 
Apple juice  0.0176  Flour  0.0140 
Backing ingredients  0.0023  Honey  0.0038 
Blancmange powder  0.0055  Ice cream  0.0063 
Chips  0.0214  Instant soups  0.0259 
Chocolate  0.0475  Pickles  0.0149 
Cold cuts  0.0128  Rye mix bread  0.0039 
Mineral water  0.1474  Salad with sausages and  
mayonnaise dressing 
0.0078 
Peas (tinned)  0.0042 
Shortbreads  0.0060  Starch, porridge and pulses (dry)  0.0091 
Soft drinks  0.0606  Sugar  0.0142 
Tea  0.0091  Tinned meat  0.0046 
Vinegar  0.0062  Toast  0.0231 
Product categories that are in the widest assortment (1
st sample) 
Baby food  0.0015  Marinades  0.0024 
Cakes (deep frozen)  0.0036  Nuts and snacks  0.0013 
Candies  0.0014  Poultry (refined)  0.0013 
Cereals  0.0033  Ravioli (tinned)  0.0025 
Fast food  0.0013  Sausages  0.0083 
Ketchup and dressing  0.0012  Studentenfutter  0.0009 
Lollies  0.0015  Whole wheat bread  0.0042 
Source: own calculation based on data from MADAKOM, 2002 
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Appendix 2  Explanations and comments on the dummy regression   
 
Variable  
in formula 2 
Abbreviations  





Endogenous variable of the dummy regression, where i and j stand for different stores in the third sample 




Mean absolute gab 
between price 
levels 
Mean absolute gab between the price level of store i and the price level of store j 
  
   
Contemporary 
adjustment 
Estimated parameter from the first part of the analysis (see formula 1). Perfect 
synchronization of price levels is shown by values of   
   near 1, while values near 
0 indicate that a price level change of store j leads to no simultaneous price level 
change in store i or vice versa. 
  
   
Speed of  
adjustment 
Estimated parameter from the first part of the analysis (see formula 1). The 
existence of a long run equilibrium is supposed to be accompanied by a negative 
value of    
  . The higher its absolute value, the faster the price levels adjust to their 
long run equilibrium. 
  Main  Estimation results for the price levels of top selling brands in the basic assortment. 
  Low  Estimation results for the price levels of low price range in the basic assortment. 
Exogenous variables 
    Constant 
       
    
Dummy variable for formats: 
Discount stores  1 if store i and j are both discount stores, 0 otherwise 
Supermarkets  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets, 0 otherwise 
Hypermarkets  1 if store i and j are both hypermarkets, 0 otherwise 
  
a  Matrices of estimated parameters for dummy variables for formats 
      
    
Dummy variable for chains (company format combinations): 
DS A  1 if store i and j are both discount stores from company A, 0 otherwise 
DS E  1 if store i and j are both discount stores from company E, 0 otherwise 
SM A  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets from company A, 0 otherwise 
SM B  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets from company B, 0 otherwise 
SM C  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets from company C, 0 otherwise 
SM D  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets from company D, 0 otherwise 
SM E  1 if store i and j are both supermarkets from company E, 0 otherwise 
HM A  1 if store i and j are both hypermarkets from company A, 0 otherwise 
HM B  1 if store i and j are both hypermarkets from company B, 0 otherwise 
HM C  1 if store i and j are both hypermarkets from company C, 0 otherwise 
HM D  1 if store i and j are both hypermarkets from company D, 0 otherwise 
    Matrices of estimated parameters for dummy variables for chaina 
     
     Same location 
Dummy variable: 1 if store i and store j have the same location (i.e., city, green 
field, residential area). The location information comes from MADAKOM (2002). 
     
     Same borough 
Dummy variable: 1 if store i and store j are in the same borough, 0 otherwise. The 
borough information comes from MADAKOM (2002). Totally, 34 different 
boroughs in Germany are given. 
      
     Coint. dummy 
Dummy variable: 1 if price levels of store i and j are cointegrated according to 
pretests (see for further information section 3 and tab. 3) 
  ,   ,     Vectors of estimated parameters for dummy variable for same location, same borough and coint. dummy 
Legend: 
a the reference group consists of stores i and j from different formats. If only chains had an impact on interformat 
price competition all estimated parameters in    would not be significantly different from zero, while elements of    
would be significantly different from zero. 
Source: MADAKOM, 2002 
 
 
 